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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Todd argued that his rights under both the Due 
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
violated when the district court punished him based on his indigent status, or, 
alternatively, that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence upon him based on his purported indigency and in light of the mitigating 
factors present in his case. In response, the State contends that the district court 
properly considered Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution as a sentencing 
factor under I.C. § 19-25211 and because Mr. Todd has not challenged the 
constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2521, he has failed to show error in the district court's 
decision to impose a prison sentence based on its belief that Mr. Todd would be unable 
repay all of the stipulated restitution. The State not only misreads I.C. § 19-2521, but 
fails to grasp the nature of the claim raised by Mr. Todd based on United States 
Supreme Court precedent or acknowledge that the prosecutor specifically argued that 
the district court should "take" Mr. Todd's time because he believed that Mr. Todd would 
be unable to repay the victim. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
1 In its briefing, the State cites to both I.C. § 18-2526 and I.C. § 19-2526 for the same 
proposition. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) Unfortunately, neither statute exists. 
However, given the quoted language referenced by the State, Appellant assumes the 
State intended to cite to I.C. § 19-2521. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Todd's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Were Mr. Todd's rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated when the district court based its decision 
to impose a long prison sentence upon Mr. Todd in part on his inability to pay the 
restitution actually imposed? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Todd's Rights Under Both The Due Process Clause And The Equal Protection 
Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated When The District Court Based 
Its Decision To Impose A Lengthy Prison Sentence Upon Mr. Todd Almost Entirely On 
Mr. Todd's Indigent Status 
A. Introduction 
The instant reply brief is necessary to address the State's claim that the district 
court properly considered Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution as a 
sentencing factor under I.C. §19-2521. However, as is set forth below, Mr. Todd's rights 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were violated when the district court viewed Mr. Todd's purported indigency as an 
aggravating factor warranting a prison sentence rather than probation, where Mr. Todd 
could attempt repay the victim for his criminal conduct and support his family. 
B. Mr. Todd's Rights Under Both The Due Process Clause And The Equal 
Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Were Violated When The 
District Court Based Its Decision To Impose A Lengthy Prison Sentence Upon 
Mr. Todd Almost Entirely On Mr. Todd's Indigent Status 
1. It Is Improper For A Sentencing Court To Impose A Harsher Sentence 
Upon A Defendant Based Upon That Defendant's Indigent Status 
In its briefing, the State argues that "Todd has not cited a single case prohibiting 
a sentencing court from considering a defendant's ability to pay restitution when that 
court imposes sentence." (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) First of all, it is necessary to clarify 
the issue presented on appeal. Idaho Code §19-2521 clearly allows a court to consider 
a defendant's willingness to compensate a victim as a mitigating factor warranting a 
defendant to be placed on probation. However, Mr. Todd is arguing that the district 
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court erred in punishing Mr. Todd, by imposing a prison sentence rather than placing 
him on probation, because both the court and the prosecutor believed Mr. Todd would 
be unable to repay the stipulated restitution, despite the fact that Mr. Todd had a job 
lined up in the event he was placed on probation. The crux of all of the cases cited in 
the Appellant's brief is that a court cannot affirmatively treat a defendant differently, 
based on the amount of money he or she has. Beardon v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 
(1983) (recognizing that "if the State determines a fine or restitution to be the 
appropriate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely because 
he lacked the resources to pay it."); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that the 
state cannot convert a fine into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and 
cannot immediately pay the fine in full); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (A 
defendant may not be subjected to imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum merely 
because they are too poor to pay a fine); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-358 
(1963) (holding that indigent defendants are entitled to counsel on first direct appeal); 
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1967) (holding that an indigent defendant is 
entitled to a free transcript of the preliminary hearing for use during the trial); Mayer v. 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198-199 (1971) (holding that an indigent defendant cannot be 
denied an adequate record to appeal a conviction, even under a fine-only statute); and 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (striking down a state 
practice of granting appellate review only to those persons who could afford the 
transcript). 
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2. Idaho Code §19-2521 Permits A District Court To Consider A Defendant's 
Payment Of Restitution Or Willingness To Pay Restitution As A Mitigating 
Factor In Deciding Whether The Defendant Should Be Placed On 
Probation And Does Not Permit The District Court To Consider A 
Defendant's Purported Inability To Pay Restitution As An Aggravating 
Factor Warranting The Imposition Of A Prison Sentence 
In its briefing, the State argues that it was permissible, under I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f), 
for the sentencing court to consider Mr. Todd's ability to pay restitution when imposing 
sentence. The State misconstrues Appellant's argument on appeal and misreads 
I.C. § 19-2521. Mr. Todd has argued that it was improper for the district court to punish 
him based on its belief that he would be unable to pay restitution. At sentencing, the 
State advocated that because it believed Mr. Todd would not be able to repay the 
restitution in full, the court should "tak[e] his time."2 (Tr., p.52, Ls.4-12.) Specifically, the 
prosecutor argued: 
Also, with regard to restitution, I know Mr. Todd is not going to pay all this 
money back. There's $60,000 here that is owed. He doesn't have a dime 
to his name right now and that money is not going to be seen by 
Mr. Lewis. I think that is the reason, you know, if he can't pay this money 
back, he has to pay it back another way, and I think taking his time is the 
only thing that the Courl has in order to impose punishment because the 
money he stole, who knows whatever happened to that. 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.4-12 (emphasis added).) The district court then obliged the prosecutor's 
request, weighing heavily Mr. Todd's purported inability to pay restitution, in choosing to 
impose a prison sentence, rather than place Mr. Todd on probation as was 
recommended by the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) investigator, 
so that Mr. Todd could begin repaying restitution, the restitution that he stipulated to. 
(Tr., p.58, L.17 - p.61, L.6; PSI, pp.9-10.) Mr. Todd is not arguing that the district court 
2 Curiously, the State makes no reference to, or attempts to defend the unconstitutional 
and unethical position taken by the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing. 
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could not have considered whether Mr. Todd had already repaid restitution or his 
willingness to repay restitution as a mitigating factor warranting a suspended sentence. 
Rather, Mr. Todd's argument is that the court erred when it punished Mr. Todd based on 
its belief that Mr. Todd would be unable to pay restitution, which is impermissible and a 
violation of Mr. Todd's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The State's reliance on I.C. §19-2521 is also misplaced. In the Respondent's 
Brief, the State argues that the district court's consideration of Mr. Todd's ability to pay 
restitution was permissible under I.C. §19-2521, and Mr. Todd's claim fails because he 
has failed to challenge the constitutionality of the referenced statute. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.5-7.) However, whether Mr. Todd has challenged the constitutionality of 
I.C. § 19-2521 is irrelevant to determine whether the district court violated Mr. Todd's 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by punishing him because of its belief he was too poor to 
repay the stipulated restitution. The fact that the statute exists does not cure any 
unconstitutionality during Mr. Todd's sentencing hearing. Additionally, I.C. § 19-
2521(2)(f) considers it a mitigating factor that a defendant has already or is willing to 
repay restitution, not an aggravating factor that a defendant is indigent and too poor to 
repay restitution. 
Idaho Code §19-2521(2)(f) provides: 
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, 
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment. 
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim 
of his criminal conduct for the damage or the injury that was 
sustained, however, nothing in this section shall prevent the 
appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in combination. 
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Idaho Code § 192521(2)(f) (emphasis added). Thus, I.C. §19-2521 requires that the 
court consider the payment or willingness to make payment as mitigating factors "in 
favor" of not imposing a prison sentence. Here, Mr. Todd stipulated to the restitution 
amount and voiced his desire to repay the victim for the losses incurred as a result of 
his criminal conduct, informing the court that upon being placed on probation he already 
had a job lined up. (Tr., p.41, Ls.14-21.) However, rather than considering this as a 
mitigating factor, which LC. §19-2521 requires, both the prosecutor and the district court 
apparently believed that Mr. Todd was too poor and would not be able to repay 
restitution, and the district court responded by treating Mr. Todd's indigent status as an 
aggravating factor, warranting a long prison sentence.3 
Accordingly, as is articulated herein and in Mr. Todd's Appellant's Brief, Mr. Todd 
asserts that his rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the district court imposed a 
lengthy prison sentence almost entirely based upon his indigent status. 
3 For some reason, the State seems to believe it is important that the district court did 
not even impose the maximum sentence upon Mr. Todd. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
However, the question is not whether harsher punishment was available to the district 
court, it is a question of whether more severe punishment was imposed based on 
Mr. Todd's indigent status. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Todd respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand 
his case for a new sentencing hearing in front of a different district court judge. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2009. 
ERIC D.FDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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